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ing under risk and under uncertainty to include incomplete beliefs
and tastes. The main results are two axiomatizations of the multi-
prior expected multi-utility representations of preference relation un-
der uncertainty, thereby resolving long standing open questions. The
Knightian uncertainty model and expected multi-utility model with
complete beliefs are obtained as special cases. In addition, the von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model with incomplete pref-
erences is revisited using a “constructive” approach, as opposed to
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11 Introduction
Facing a choice between alternatives that are not fully understood, or are
not readily comparable, decision makers may ﬁnd themselves unable to ex-
press preferences for one alternative over another, or to choose between such
alternatives in a coherent manner. This problem was recognized by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern who stated that “It is conceivable - and may even in
a way be more realistic - to allow for cases where the individual is neither
able to state which of two alternatives he prefers nor that they are equally
desirable.” (von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947] p. 19).1 In the same vein,
when discussing the axiomatic structure of what became known as the Cho-
quet expected utility theory, Schmeidler says “Out of the seven axioms listed
here the completeness of the preferences seems to me the most restrictive
and most imposing assumption of the theory.” (Schmeidler [1989] p.576).2 A
natural way of accommodating such situations while maintaining the other
aspects of the theory of rational choice is to relax the assumption that the
preference relations are complete.
The objective of studying the representations of incomplete preferences
is to identify preference structures on the set of acts that admits multi-prior
expected multi-utility representation. Speciﬁcally, an act f, is preferred over
another act, g, if and only if there is a nonempty set, Φ, of pairs (π,U)
consisting of a probability measure, π, on the set of states, S, and aﬃne,
real-valued function, U, on the set, ∆(X), of simple probability measures on
the set, X, of outcomes such that
X
s∈S
π (s)U (f (s)) ≥
X
s∈S
π (s)U (g (s)), for all (π,U) ∈ Φ. (1)
Aumann (1962) was the ﬁrst to address this issue in the context of ex-
pected utility theory under risk (that is, the case in which π in the repre-
1Later von Neumann and Morgenstern add “We have to concede that one may doubt
whether a person can always decide which of two alternatives ... he prefers.” (von Neumann
and Morgenstern [1947] p. 28-29). In a letter to H. Wold, dated October 28, 1946,
von Neumann discusses the issue of complete preferences. Among others, he says “The
general comparability of utilities, i.e., the completeness of their ordering by (one person’s)
subjective preferences, is, of course, highly dubious in many important situations.” (Redei
(2005)).
2Schmeidler goes as far as suggesting that the main contributions of all other axioms is
to allow the weakening of the completeness assumption. Yet, he maintains this assumption
in his theory.
2sentation above is a degenerate probability measure that assigns the entire
probability mass to one state). Maintaining the axiomatic structure of the
von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, Aumann showed that without the com-
pleteness axiom, which “... excludes the possibility that an individual may
be willing and able to arrive at a preference decisions only for certain pairs
of lotteries, while for others he may be unwilling or unable to arrive at a
decision.” (p. 446) one lottery is (weakly) preferred over another only if
its expected utility is greater for a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions. (In terms of the representation (1), Aumann’s work correspond to
Φ = {δs}×U, where U is a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
and δs is the degenerate lottery that assigns weight 1 to state s). This is a
generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory in the sense that,
if the completeness axioms is added, the set of utility functions reduces to
a singleton. More recently, Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok (2004) studied the
existence and uniqueness properties of the representations of preference rela-
tions over lotteries whose domain is a compact metric space. They show that
preference relations whose structures are depicted by the axioms of expected
utility theory without the completeness axiom are characterized by expected
multi-utility representation a la Aumann (1962). Moreover, the utility func-
tions that ﬁgure in the representation are unique in the sense that any other
expected multi-utility representation of the same preference relation must
span a cone whose closure is the same as that of the original representation
with possible shifts resulting from adding constant functions.
The issue of incomplete preferences in the context of decision making
under uncertainty was ﬁrst addressed by Bewley (2002), who axiomatized
what he refers to as Knightian uncertainty. Bewley’s analysis invokes the
Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model while departing from the assumption that
the preference relation is complete.3 In Bewley’s model, the incompleteness
of the preference relations is due, solely, to the incompleteness of beliefs. This
incompleteness is represented by a closed convex set of probability measures
on the set of states. Accordingly, one act is preferred over another (or the
status quo) if its associated subjective expected utility exceeds that of the
alternative (or the status quo) according to every probability measures in
the set. In terms of the representation (1), Bewley’s work correspond to
Φ = Π×{U}, where Π is a closed convex set of probability measures on the
3Bewley’s original work, under the same title, ﬁrst appeared as a Cowles Foundation
discussion paper no. 807, in (1986).
3set of states and U is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.4
As in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, the incompleteness in the
Anscombe-Aumann model may also be due to incomplete tastes. The issue
of representation of preference relations that accommodates incompleteness
of both beliefs and tastes was studied by Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane
(1995), Nau (2006) and, more recently, by Ok, Ortoleva and Riella (2008).
Seidenfeld et. al. (1995) axiomatized the case in which the representation
entails Φ = {(π,U)}. Ok et. al. (2008) axiomatized a preference structure in
which the source of incompleteness is either beliefs or tastes, but not both.
Again, in terms of the representation (1), Ok et. al. (2008) axiomatized the
cases in which Φ = Π × {U} or Φ = {π} × U.
The axiomatization of incompleteness in both beliefs and tastes (that is,
the cases in which the representation (1) involves the sets Φ = {(π,U) |
U ∈ U, π ∈ ΠU} or Φ = Π × U remained open questions. In this paper
we address these questions and propose axiomatizations of both type of rep-
resentations. In addition, we introduce new axiomatizations of Knightian
uncertainty and of preference relations characterized by complete beliefs and
uncertain tastes.5
Most of the studies mentioned above that use convex analysis as the main
analytical tool.6 In this paper, we revisit the problem using a “constructive”
approach, which makes the representation more transparent and easier to
understand. To begin with, we obtain a representation of incomplete, von
Neumann-Morgenstern, preferences over convex subsets of linear spaces that
have a greatest element (that is, an element that is strictly preferred to every
other element of the set) and a smallest element (that is, an element that
every other element of the set is strictly preferred to it). We note that ex-
pected multi-utility representations in the case of risk and additively separa-
ble multi-utility representation under uncertainty are obtained as corollaries
of this result.
Our main results consist of necessary and suﬃcient conditions charac-
terizing the preference structures that admit the aforementioned, multi-prior
4Seidenfeld et. al.(1995) regard the study of incomplete preferences under uncertainty,
and that of multi-prior representations, as motivated, in part, by the interest in robust
Bayesian statistics.
5Ok et. al. (2008) give an example showing that it is impossible to obtain an iden-
tiﬁcation of incomplete tastes and beliefs in their model. We examine their example in
subsection 4.3 below and show why it does not apply to our model.
6The exception of Seidenfeld et. al. (1995) who use transﬁnite induction.
4expected multi-utility representations. The ﬁrst set of conditions includes the
familiar von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms without the completeness axiom.
To these we add a dominance axiom, a la Savage’s Postulate P7. Speciﬁcally,
let g and f be any two acts and denote by fs the constant act whose payoﬀ
is f (s) in every state. Then the axiom requires that if g is strictly preferred
over fs, for every s, then g be strictly preferred over f. With this axiom we
obtain a representation as in (1) in which the set Φ consists of probability-
utility pairs, (π,U) such that U is an element of a convex set, U, of aﬃne,
real-valued utility functions on the set of simple lotteries, ∆(X), and π is
an element of a corresponding convex set, ΠU, of probability measures on S.
The second result involves an axiom belief consistency. To state this axiom
we ﬁrst identify a set, M, of all the probability measures on S that may be
involved in the evaluation of acts. Belief consistency requires that if one act,
say f, is strictly preferred over another act, g, then every constant act ob-
tained by reduction of f under every compound lottery involving an element
of M be preferred over the corresponding reduction of g. The representation
in this case is as in (1) above in which the set Φ is a product set M × U,
where M is a closed and convex set of probability measures on S and U is
as above.
Knightian uncertainty and expected multi-utility representation with com-
plete beliefs, are obtained as special cases. The ﬁrst involves completeness of
the conditional (on the states) preference relations, and second a formulation
of a new behavioral postulate depicting the completeness of beliefs.7 By and
large, our analysis pertains to decision problems involving choice sets whose
elements are either simple lotteries or acts whose consequences are simple
lotteries. However, we show that, by replacing the Archimedean axiom with
topological continuity, our treatment of the expected multi-utility model may
be extended to include the case of Borel probability measures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section
we study the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory without the completeness
axiom. Following that, in Section 3 we present our main results. In section 4
we discuss several implications of the main results as well as the signiﬁcance
of the preferential boundedness. of the choice set. The special cases, Knigh-
tian uncertainty and its dual, the subjective expected multi-utility model
with complete beliefs, are discussed in Section 5. Further discussion and
7Ok et. al. (2008) regard the absence of such formulation as a possible explanation for
lack of attention to this case in the literature.
5concluding remarks appear in Section 6. The proofs are collected in Section
7.
2 The von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory with-
out the Completeness Axiom
2.1 The analytical framework and the preference struc-
ture
Let C be a convex subset of a ﬁnite dimensional linear space, L. A preference
relation is a binary relation on C denoted by . The set C is said to be -
bounded if there exist pM and pm in C such that pM  p  pm, for all
p ∈ C − {pM,pm}.
Consider the following axioms depicting the structure of .
(A.1) (Strict partial order) The preference relation  is transitive and
irreﬂexive.
(A.2) (Archimedean) For all p,q,r ∈ C, if p  q and q  r then βp +
(1 − β)r  q and q  αp + (1 − α)r for some α,β ∈ (0,1).
(A.3) (Independence) For all p,q,r ∈ C and α ∈ (0,1], p  q if and only
if αp + (1 − α)r  αq + (1 − α)r.
The diﬀerence between the preference structure above and that of ex-
pected utility theory is that the induced relation ¬(p  q) is reﬂexive but
not necessarily transitive (hence it is not necessarily a preorder). Moreover,
it is not necessarily complete. Thus, ¬(p  q) and ¬(q  p)does not imply
that p and q are indiﬀerent (i.e., equivalent), rather they may be noncompa-
rable. If p and q are noncomparable we write p ./ q.
Deﬁnitions 1: For all p,q ∈ C, (a) p < q if r  p implies r  q, for all
r ∈ C, (b) p ∼ q if p < q and q < p; and (c) p D q if p < q and
¬(p  q).
If  satisﬁes (A.1)-(A.3) then the derived binary relation < on C is a
weak order (that is, transitive and reﬂexive) satisfying the Archimedean and
6independence axioms that is not necessarily complete.8 The indiﬀerence
relation, ∼, that is, the symmetric part of <, is an equivalence relation.9
Taking the strict preference relation, , as primitive, it is customary to
deﬁne the weak preference relations as the negation of . Formally, given
a binary relation  on C, deﬁne a binary relation < on C by: p < q if
¬(q  p).10 If the strict preference relation, , is transitive and irreﬂexive,
then the weak preference relation is complete. Karni (2010a) shows that the
weak preference relation, in Deﬁnitions 1 agrees with the customary deﬁnition
if and only if the latter is complete.
The standard practice in decision theory is to weak preference relation
as primitive and deﬁne the strict preference relation as it asymmetric part.
Invoking the standard practice, Dubra (2010), showed that if the C is the
set of lotteries on a ﬁnite set of prizes and the weak preference relation is
nontrivial (that is, 6= ∅) and satisﬁes (A.3), then any two of the following
axioms implied the third, completeness, Archimedean, and mixture conti-
nuity.11 Thus, a nontrivial, partial, preorder satisfying independence must
fail to satisfy one of the continuity axioms. Karni (2010a) showed that, if
the weak preference relation is as in Deﬁnitions 1, then a nontrivial pref-
erence relation may satisfy independence, Archimedean, mixture continuity
and yet be incomplete. Hence, the approach taken here seems more natural
for modeling incomplete preferences as an extension of the choice theory with
complete preferences.
For every p ∈ C, let B (p) := {q ∈ C | q  p} and W (p) := {q ∈ C | p 
q} denote the upper and lower contour sets of p, respectively. The relation
 is convex if the upper contour set is convex.
Lemma 1: Let  be a binary relation on C. If  satisﬁes (A.1), (A.2)
and (A.3) then it is convex. Moreover, the lower contour set is also convex.
The proof is by two applications of (A.3).12
8The proof of the claim about the independence is part of the proof of Theorem 1,
below.
9Derived weak orders, close in spirit to Deﬁnitions 1, based on a pseudo-transitive weak
order appear in Chateauneuf (1987).
10See for example Chateauneuf (1987) and Kreps (1988).
11A weak preference relation satisﬁes mixture continuity if, for all p,q,r ∈ ∆(X) the
sets {α ∈ [0,1] | αp + (1 − α)q < r} and {α ∈ [0,1] | r < αp + (1 − α)q} are closed.
12Let q,r ∈ B (p) and α ∈ [0,1]. To prove the lemma we need to show that αq +
(1 − α)r  p. Apply (A.3) twice to obtain, αq + (1 − α)r  αp + (1 − α)r and αp +
(1 − α)r  αp + (1 − α)p. The same applies to W (p).
72.2 Simple examples
The following examples illustrate some of the ideas expounded on below, and
provide simple geometric interpretations. Let C = {p ∈ [0,1]
3 | Σ3
i=1pi = 1}
be the two-dimensional simplex in R3 and  a preference relation on C.13
Suppose that C is -bounded and let δx3 and δx1 be the  greatest and
smallest elements of C (see Figure 1 below).
Fix p ∈ C, such that p  δx2. The upper and lower contour sets of p,
B (p) and W (p), are delineated by the preimages of the real-valued, aﬃne,
functions on C deﬁned by U1 (q) = inf{α ∈ [0,1] | ((1 − α),0,α)  q},
U1 (q) = sup{α ∈ [0,1] | q  ((1 − α),0,α)}, U2 (q) = inf{α ∈ [0,1] |
(0,(1 − α),α)  q} and U2 (q) = sup{α ∈ [0,1] | q  (0,(1 − α),α)}. Notice
that U1 (p) ≥ U1 (q) and U2 (p) ≥ U2 (q). Consequently, q  p if and only if q
is an interior element of B (p) (that is, if and only if Ui (p) > Ui (q), i = 1,2),
p < q if and only if q ∈ ¯ B (p), where ¯ B (p) is the closure of B (p) (that is,
if and only if Ui (p) ≥ Ui (q), i = 1,2, with equality for some i). Hence, the
relation  is represented by the doubleton set of functions, U = {U1,U2}.
This is the minimal set of functions that ﬁgure in this representation.
For all p,q ∈ C, p ./ q if and only if q is an element of the intersection of
the complements of B (p) and W (p). In this case, it must be that U (p) ≥
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13For instance, let xi, i = 1,2,3 denotes sums of money and suppose that x1 < x2 < x3.
Then p = (p1,p2,p3) is interpreted to be a lottery that assigns the probability pi to winning
the prize xi.
8Consider next the three-dimensional simplex, C, in R3. Assume C is -
bounded and that δx4 = (0,0,0,1) and δx1 = (1,0,0,0) are, respectively, the
 greatest and smallest elements of C. Suppose that the preference relation
 is characterized by a full dimensional cone. Let U and U deﬁned as above.
In general, U and U are not aﬃne on C.
For each p ∈ C, let L(p) be the vector subspace spanned by the vectors
δx4 − p and p − δx1. The restrictions of U and U to the two-dimensional
simplex, ∆ = C ∩ L(p) are aﬃne functions. Hence, the restrictions of the
upper and lower contour sets of p to L(p), that is Bp (p) := B (p)∩L(p) and
Wp (p) := W (p) ∩ L(p) are delineated by the U and U restricted to L(p).
These sets, and the corresponding restrictions of U and U, are not necessarily
the same for L(p) and L(q) (see Figure 2). However, for all p and q in C,
q  p if and only if q in an interior element of B (p); q < p if and only if
























2.3 The fundamental representation theorem
We present a general result giving rise to the ﬁnite-dimensional expected
multi-utility representations under risk, and additively separable multi-utility
representation under uncertainty, as immediate implications. To state this
result, we use the following notations: Let B be a set of sets of real-valued,
aﬃne, functions on L such that U ∈ B implies that B(U) := {p ∈ L | u(p) >
9u(0) for all u ∈ U} is algebraically open in L. We denote by hUi the closure
of the convex cone generated by all the functions in U and all the constant
function on L.
Theorem 1 Let C be a nonempty, convex, subset of a ﬁnite dimensional
linear space, L. Let  be a binary relation on C, then the following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) C is -bounded and  satisﬁes (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3)




U (p) > U (pm), for all p ∈ C − {pM,pm}, and U ∈ U and, for all p,q ∈ C,
q < p ⇔ U (q) ≥ U (p) for all U ∈ U (2)
and
q  p ⇔ U (q) > U (p) for all U ∈ U. (3)
Moreover, if V is another set in B that represent < and  in the sense of
(2) and (3), respectively, then hVi = hUi. 14
Remark 1: It is shown in the proof and q D p if and only if U (q) ≥ U (p)
for all U ∈ U and U (q) = U (p) for some U ∈ U.
Remark 2: Seidenfeld et. al. (1995) show that a strict partial order,
deﬁned by strict ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, has expected multi-utility
representation, satisﬁes the independence axiom and violates the Archimedean
axiom.15 To bypass this problem, Seidenfeld et. al. (1995) and subsequent
writers invoked alternative continuity axioms that, unlike the Archimedean
axiom, require the imposition of a topological structures.16 We maintained
the Archimedean axiom as our continuity postulate at the cost of restrict-
ing the upper counter sets associated with the strict preference relation,
B (p) := {q ∈ C | q  p}, to be algebraically open. (In the example of Sei-
denfeld et. al. (1995) these sets are closed). Given the trade-oﬀ involved, this
restriction seems, to us, reasonable. Moreover, restricting the upper contour
set in this manner, we follow a long tradition in economic theory.
14Shapley and Baucells (1998) has a similar result in their Theorem 1.8.
15See example 2.1 in their paper.
16See Dubra et. al. (2004) and Nau (2006).
102.4 Expected multi-utility representation for simple
probability measures
Let X = {x1,...,xn} be a ﬁnite set of prizes and denote by ∆(X) the set of
all probability measures on X. For each `,`0 ∈ ∆(X) and α ∈ [0,1] deﬁne
α` + (1 − α)`0 ∈ ∆(X) by (α` + (1 − α)`0)(x) = α`(x) + (1 − α)`0 (x),
for all x ∈ X. Then ∆(X) is a convex subset of the linear space RX. Let
`M,`m ∈ ∆(X) satisfy `M  `  `m, for all ` ∈ ∆(X). Application of
Theorem 1 to C = ∆(X) yields an expected multi-utility representation.
Corollary 1 (Expected multi-utility representation) Let  be a
binary relation on ∆(X), then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) ∆(X) is -bounded and  satisﬁes (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3).
(ii) There exists nonempty, closed and convex set, U ∈ B, of real-valued












for all ` ∈ ∆(X) − {`M,`m}, and u ∈ U and, for all p,q ∈ ∆(X),






u(x)q (x), for all u ∈ U, (4)
and






u(x)q (x), for all u ∈ U. (5)
Moreover, if V is another set of real-valued, aﬃne, functions on ∆(X) that
represent < and  in the sense of (4) and (5), respectively, then hVi = hUi.
Proof: Let C = ∆(X) and U = {u ∈ RX | u · p = U (p), U ∈ U}, then
the conclusions of the corollary are implied by Theorem 1.
2.5 Additively separable multi-utility representation
Consider the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model. Let S be a ﬁnite set of
states. Subsets of S are events. Let H := {h : S → ∆(X)} be the set whose
elements are acts. For all h,h0 ∈ H and α ∈ [0,1], αh + (1 − α)h0 ∈ H
11is deﬁned by (αh + (1 − α)h0)(s) = αh(s) + (1 − α)h0 (s), for all s ∈ S.17
Under this deﬁnition H = ∆(X)
S is a convex subset of the linear space
RX×S. Let hM,hm ∈ H satisfy hM  h  hm, for all h ∈ H.
Applying Theorem 1 to H, we obtain the following:18
Corollary 2 (Additive multi-utility representation) Let  be a
binary relation on H, then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) H is -bounded and  satisﬁes (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3).
(ii) There exists nonempty, convex and closed, set W ∈ B of real-valued



































0 (s),s), for all w ∈ W. (7)
Moreover, if W0 is another set of real-valued, aﬃne, functions on H that
represent < and  in the sense of (6) and (7), respectively, then hW0i = hWi.
The proof is by the application of a standard argument (see Kreps [1988])
to U in the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 3: Let Ws := {w(·,s) | w ∈ W}. By Corollary 1, w(h(s),s) = P
x∈Supp(h(s)) u(x;s)h(x;s), where u(·,s) is a real-valued function on X, for
all s ∈ S.
The representations in Corollary 2 are not the most parsimonious as the
set W includes functions that are not redundant (that is, their removal does
17For every s ∈ S, the convex mixture αh(s)+(1 − α)h0 (s) is deﬁned as in the preceding
subsection.
18A similar result appears in Nau (2006) for ﬁnite X. Ok, et. al. (2008) show that
the same holds when X is a compact metric space. As mentioned, these authors use a
continuity assumption stronger than (A.2).
12not aﬀect the representation). Henceforth, we can consider a subset of W that
is suﬃcient for the representation. We denote the set of these functions by Wo
and call it the set of essential functions We also deﬁne the sets of essential
component functions Wo
s := {w(·,s) | w ∈ Wo}, s ∈ S. As part of the
proof of Theorem 2 below, we show that, under additional assumptions to be
speciﬁed, the component functions corresponding to the essential functions
in Wo, are positive linear transformations of one another (under suitably
chosen Wo).
3 The Main Results
Our main results are extensions of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model to
include incomplete preferences. As mentioned earlier, the incompleteness in
this model may stem from two distinct sources, namely, beliefs and tastes.
We present below two models in which these sources of incompleteness are
represented by sets of priors and utilities, respectively. In the ﬁrst, more
general model, the beliefs and tastes are not entirely separated, and the
representation involves sets of priors that are “utility dependent.” The second
model entails total separation of beliefs and tastes and the representation
involves sets of priors and utility functions that are independent.
3.1 Multi-prior expected multi-utility representation I
- The general case
3.1.1 Dominance
For each f ∈ H and every s ∈ S, let fs denote the constant act whose payoﬀ
is f (s) in every state. Fromally, fs (s0) = f (s) for all s0 ∈ S. The next
axiom, which is a special case of Savage’s (1954) postulate P7, requires that
if an act, g, is strictly preferred over every constant act, fs, obtained by from
the act f, then g be strictly preferred over f. Formally,
(A.4) (Dominance) For all f,g ∈ H, if g  fs for every s ∈ S, then g  f.
Axiom (A.4) appears and discussed in Fishburn (1970).19 Later we shall
observe that, in conjunction with the other axioms, axiom (A.4) implies that
19See Fishburn (1970), p. 179.
13if a decision maker prefers one act over another under all conceivable beliefs
about the likelihoods of the states, then he prefers the former act over the
latter.20
3.1.2 Multi-prior expected multi-utility representation
Theorem 2 below shows that a preference relation satisﬁes the axioms (A.1)-
(A.4) if and only if there is a non-empty convex set of aﬃne utility functions
on ∆(X) and, corresponding to each utility function, a convex set of prob-
ability measures on S such that when presented with a choice between two
acts the decision maker prefers the acts that yield higher expected utility
according to every utility function and every probability measure in the cor-
responding set. Let the set of probability-utility pairs that ﬁgure in the
representation be Φ := {(π,U) | U ∈ U, π ∈ ΠU}. Each (π,U) ∈ Φ deﬁne
a hyperplane w := π · U. Denote by W the set of all these hyperplanes, and
deﬁne hΦi =hWi.
Theorem 2 Let  be a binary relation on H, then the following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) H is -bounded and  is nonempty satisfying (A.1) - (A.4).
(ii) There exists a nonempty, closed and convex, set, U ∈ B, of real-
valued, aﬃne, functions on ∆(X), and closed and convex sets ΠU, U ∈ U,



































0 (s))π (s), for all (π,U) ∈ Φ, (9)
where Φ = {(π,U) | U ∈ U, π ∈ ΠU}.
20Notice this assumption is weaker than the “weak reduction axiom” of Ok et al. (2008).
Note also that, unlike the “weak reduction axiom,” reduction consistency does not include
an existential clause.
14Moreover, if Φ0 = {(π0,V ) | V ∈ V, π0 ∈ ΠV} is an another set of real-
valued, aﬃne, functions on ∆(X) and sets of probability measures on S that
represent < and  in the sense of (8) and (9), respectively, then, hΦ0i = hΦi
and π (s) > 0 for all s.
Note that, since the set of priors representing the beliefs may depend on
the utility function that capture the tastes, the representation in Theorem 2
does not completely separates beliefs from tastes .
3.2 Multi-prior expected multi-utility representation
II - The product case
3.2.1 Beliefs consistency
To grasp the meaning of the next axiom it is helpful to consider the state-
space representation of preferences in subjective expected utility theory, and
the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In
these models, the relevant sets of subjective probabilities (a singleton, in the
ﬁrst instance) are deﬁned by the hyperplanes supporting the upper counter
sets at certainty.21 We employ the same reasoning below, to identify all the
probability measures on S that may be involved in the evaluation of the acts.
Speciﬁcally, these measures are the normalized normals of the supporting
hyperplanes of the upper (and lower) contour sets of acts representing certain
outcomes.22 Let M denote the set of all these measures.
Consider an act-probability pair (f,α) ∈ H×∆(S). For every f ∈ H and
α ∈ ∆(S), let fα be the constant act deﬁned by fα (s) = Σs0∈Sαs0f (s0) for all
s ∈ S. Then, fa is the constant act obtained by reduction of the compound
lottery (f,α). The axiom asserts that g  f is suﬃcient for the reduction of
(α,g) to be preferred over the reduction of (α,f) for all α ∈ M.
To formalize this discussion, ﬁx x ∈ X and denote by hx the constant
act deﬁned by hx (s) = δx, for all s ∈ S. (That is, hx ∈ R|S|×|X| and may
be written as hx = (δx,...,δx), where δx ∈ RX is the degenerate lottery that
puts weight 1 on some x ∈ X). Then B (hx) is a convex set in the linear
space R|S|×|X|.
Let T be the set of the supporting hyperplanes of B (hx) at hx. That is,
T is the set of hyperplanes T (ξT,hx) = {y ∈ R|S|×|X| | ξT · (y − hx) = 0}
21To be exact, the probabilities are the normalized normals of these hyperplanes.
22Note that, some of these measures, may be non-essential, which means that they do
not restrict the preference relation.
15such that B (hx) ∈ ∩T∈T T +, where T + = {y ∈ R|S|×|X| | ξT · (y − hx) ≥ 0},
is the positive half-space deﬁne by T, and ξT denotes the normal of T.23 For
each T ∈ T , let βT ∈ R|S| be deﬁned by βT (s) = Σx∈XξT (x,s), and let
αT ∈ ∆(S) be deﬁned by αT (s) = βT (s)/Σs0∈SβT (s0). Deﬁne M = {αT ∈
∆(S) | T ∈ T }.
The next axiom requires that if an act g is strictly preferred over another
act f then the constant act gα is preferred over the constant act fα, for all
α ∈ M. Formally,
(A.5) (Beliefs consistency) For all f,g ∈ H, g  f implies that gα  fα,
for all α ∈ M.
Notice that the necessity of this condition is implied by Theorem 2.
Hence, taken together, axioms (A.1) - (A.5) amount to the condition that
each of these measures combines with each of the utility functions in the
process of assessing the merits of the alternative acts.
3.2.2 Multi-prior expected multi-utility product representation
Our second main result is a representation theorem that totally separates
beliefs from tastes. Speciﬁcally, it shows that a preference relation satisﬁes
(A.1)-(A.5) if and only if there is a nonempty, convex set, U, of utility func-
tions on ∆(X) and a nonempty convex, set, M, of probability measures
on S such that when presented with a choice between two acts the decision
maker prefers one act over another if and only if the former act yields higher
expected utility according to every combination of a utility function and a
probability measure in these sets.
Theorem 3 Let  be a binary relation on H, then the following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) H is -bounded and  is nonempty satisfying (A.1) - (A.5).
(ii) There exists a nonempty, closed and convex set U ∈ B, of real-valued

















23Since B (hx) is a convex set in the linear space R|S|×|X|, the set T is well-deﬁned and
convex.




















0 (s))π (s), for all (π,U) ∈ M × U,
(11)
Moreover, if V and M0, is another pair of sets of real-valued, aﬃne,
functions on ∆(X) and probability measures on S that represent < and 
in the sense of (10) and (11), respectively, then V (U) = bUU + aU, bU > 0
for all U ∈ U, M = M0, and π (s) > 0 for all s.
Remark 4: The set M is the convex hull of union over U of the sets of
probability measures, ΠU, that ﬁgure in Theorem 2.
4 Discussion
4.1 State-independent preferences
Consider the following additional notations and deﬁnitions. For each h ∈ H
and s ∈ S let h−sp the act that is obtained by replacing the s−th coordinate
of h, h(s), with p. Deﬁne the conditional preference relation, s on ∆(X),
by p s q if there exists h−s such that h−sp  h−sq, for all p,q ∈ ∆(X). A
state s is said to be nonnull if p s q, for some p,q ∈ ∆(X), and it is null
otherwise.
Deﬁnition 3: A preference relation displays state-independence if s=s0,
for all nonnull s,s0 ∈ S.
Lemma 2: Let  be a nonempty binary relation on H, and suppose that
H is -bounded. If  satisﬁes (A.1) - (A.4), then it displays state-
independent preferences. Moreover, all states are non-null and hM =
(δx1,...,δx1) and hm = (δx2,...,δx2) for some x1,x2 ∈ X.
17We denote pM = δx1 and pm = δx2. The proof is an immediate implication
of Theorem 2, and is omitted. Note that if the preference relation satisﬁes
(A.1) - (A.3) and is complete, then state-independence is equivalence to
monotonicity (that is, if h(s) < h0 (s) (as constant acts) for every s ∈ S
then h < h0). This equivalence does not hold when the preference relation is
incomplete (see Ok et. al. (2008)).
4.2 Coherent beliefs
It is noteworthy that the axiomatic structure of the preference relation de-
picted by (A.1) - (A.4) implies that the decision maker’s beliefs are coherent.
To deﬁne the notion of coherent beliefs, let hp denote the constant act whose
payoﬀ is hp (s) = p for every s ∈ S. For each event E, pEq ∈ H is the act
whose payoﬀ is p for all s ∈ E and q for all s ∈ S − E. Denote pαq the
constant act whose payoﬀ, in every state, is αp+(1 − α)q. A bet on an event
E is the act pEq, whose payoﬀs satisfy hp  hq.
Suppose that the decision maker considers the constant act pαq preferable
to the bet pEq. This is interpreted to imply that he believes α exceeds the
likelihood of E. This belief is coherent if the same holds for any other bet
on E and the corresponding constant acts (that is, if hp1  hq1, then the
constant acts p1αq1 is preferable to the bet p1Eq1). The same logic applies
when the bet pEq is preferable to the constant act pαq. Formally,
Deﬁnition 4: A preference relation  on H exhibits coherent beliefs if, for
all events E and p,q,p0,q0 ∈ ∆(X) such that hp  hq and hp0  hq0,
pαq  pEq if and only if p0αq0  p0Eq0 and pEq  pαq if and only if
p0Eq0  p0αq0.
Lemma 3: Let  be a nonempty binary relation on H satisfying (A.1)
- (A.4). Suppose that H is -bounded, then  exhibits coherent beliefs.
The proof is an immediate implication of Theorem 2, and is omitted.
4.3 On the signiﬁcance of -boundedness
Ok et. al. (2008), give an example showing the existence of a prefer-
ence relation that satisﬁes independence, monotonicity, continuity and state-
18independence and yet, has no multi-prior expected multi-utility, representa-








Deﬁne p  q if and only if U(p) ≥ U(q) and V (p) ≥ V (q), for all p,q ∈
∆(X)S. This preference relation has no multi-prior expected multi-utility
representation.
This example does not apply to our setting. Speciﬁcally, in this preference
relation there is no greatest element. Assume the existence of the greatest









We show next that preference relation deﬁned by these tables does not satisfy













35) where the ﬁrst number is the weigh on pM and the second







35 = U(q) and V (p) = 243
35 > 225
35 = V (q).
Also, constant act r is preferred to constant act t since U(r) = 254
35 > 253
35 =
U(t) and V (r) = 255
35 > 246
35 = V (t). But U(p,r)−U(q,t) = − 4
35 < 0 implying
that (p,q)  (q,t) does not hold. Hence,  does not satisfy monotonicity
and, therefore, our model is not inconsistent with this example.
5 Special Cases
Consider next two special cases. The ﬁrst, known as Knightian uncertainty,
involves incomplete beliefs and complete tastes. The second involves incom-
plete tastes and complete beliefs.
5.1 Knightian uncertainty
Consider the extension of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model to include
incomplete preferences, and suppose that the incompleteness is due, entirely,
19to incomplete beliefs. In other words, the decision maker knows his risk
attitudes and is capable of comparing and expressing his preferences between
any two lotteries in every state. This case was dealt with by Bewley (2002)
and is referred to as Knightian uncertainty.24
The model of Knightian uncertainty requires a formal deﬁnition of com-
plete tastes. The next axiom formalizes the completeness of tastes:25
(A.6) (Complete tastes) For every s ∈ S and p,q ∈ ∆(X), either p <s q
or q <s p.
Note that Lemma 2 and (A.6) imply that the preference relation < is
complete on the set of constant acts. This is the assumption of Bewley
(2002). The next theorem is our version of Knightian uncertainty.
Theorem 4 Let  be a binary relation on H, then the following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) H is -bounded,  is nonempty and satisﬁes (A.1) - (A.4) and (A.6).
(ii) There exists a nonempty, closed, convex set, M, of probability mea-



































0 (s))π (s), for all π ∈ M. (13)
Moreover, U is unique up to positive linear transformation, M is unique,
and for all π ∈ M, π (s) > 0 for any s.
24See also Ok et. al. (2008).
25In the presence of (A.4), this axiom is equivalent to the strict preference relation
 being complete on the subset of constant acts. This is sometimes called the partial
completeness axiom (see Ok [2007]).
205.2 Subjective expected multi-utility representation with
complete beliefs
Consider next the extension of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model to the
dual case of Knightian uncertainty in which incompleteness of the decision-
maker’s preferences is due solely to the incompleteness of his tastes. This
situation was modeled in Ok et. al. (2008) using an axiom they call re-
duction.26 We propose here an alternative formulation based on the idea of
completeness of beliefs. This idea is captured by the following axiom:27
(A.7) (Complete beliefs) For all events E and α ∈ [0,1], either pMαpm 
pMEpm or pMEpm  pMα0pm for all α > α0.
A preference relation  displays complete beliefs if it satisﬁes (A.7). If
the beliefs are complete then the incompleteness of the preference relation
on H is due entirely to the incompleteness of tastes. The next theorem is
the subjective expected multi-utility version of the Anscome-Aumann (1963)
model corresponding to the situation in which the decision maker’s beliefs
are complete.28
Theorem 5 Let  be a binary relation on H and < the induced binary
relation given in Deﬁnition 1, then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) H is -bounded,  is nonempty and satisﬁes (A.1) - (A.4) and (A.7).
(ii) There exists a nonempty convex and closed set, U ∈ B, of real-valued,

























0 (s))π (s) for all U ∈ U. (14)
26The reduction axiom of Ok et. al. (2008) requires that, for every h ∈ H, there exists
a probability measure, µ, on S such that hµ ∼ h.
27Unlike weak reduction of Ok et. al. (2008), neither complete beliefs nor complete
tastes involve an existential clause.










0 (s))π (s) for all U ∈ U. (15)
Moreover, if V is another set of real-valued, aﬃne, functions on ∆(X)
that represent < in the sense of (14) and (15), respectively, then hVi = hUi.
The probability measure, π, is unique and π (s) > 0 if and only if s is nonnull.
Remark 5: For every event E, deﬁne the upper probability of E is
πu (E) = inf{α ∈ [0,1] | pMαpm  pMEpm} and the lower probability of
E is πl (E) = sup{α ∈ [0,1] | pMEpm  pMαpm}. Lemma 3 asserts that the
upper an lower probabilities are well-deﬁned.29 Theorem 5 implies that a
preference relation  satisfying (A.1) - (A.4) displays complete beliefs if and
only if πu (E) = πl (E), for every E.
6 Concluding Remarks
Choice theoretic models that depart from the completeness axiom are poten-
tially useful in a variety of applications. Seidenfeld et. al. (1995) emphasized
their potential role in establishing a choice-based foundations of Bayesian ro-
bustness analysis in statistics. Possible economic applications include medi-
cal decision making, where the states involved are the decision maker’s health
status. Considering a state of health that he have not experienced, a deci-
sion maker may ﬁnd himself unable to compare risky medical treatments.
Another example is the need to choose among alternative pension plans. In
general, such plans are complicated and diﬃcult to compare. It may well
be the case that a decision maker ﬁnd the plans incomparable. Behaviorally
this may result in inertia, that is, if assigned randomly to a particular plan,
a decision maker may be reluctant to switch to another plan.
In this paper we studied alternative axiomatizations of strict partial or-
ders, depicting choice behavior under risk and under uncertainty, and their
corresponding representations. Taking a “constructive” approach, we revis-
ited some known results, oﬀering variations on the axiomatic structure. In
addition, we extended the analysis to obtain some new results, the most im-
portant of which are two axiomatizations of the multi-prior expected multi-
utility representation.
29Notice that  displays complete beliefs if and only if there exists a probability measure
µ on S such that pMµ(E)pm < pMEpm < pMµ(E)pm for every event E.
22Following conventional usage, we interpreted Knightian uncertainty, or
the multi-prior expected utility as expression of incomplete beliefs. We note,
however, that, as is the case in the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and other
models based on the analytical framework of Savage (1954), the probabilities
in this model are based on the convention that constant acts are constant
utility acts.30 Because this convention is not implied by the axiomatic struc-
ture, it may well be that what is referred two as incomplete beliefs is in fact
an expression of incomplete tastes of a particular kind, namely, variations
in the utility functions across states that does not involve variations in the
risk attitudes. By contrast, what is usually referred to as incomplete tastes
pertains to situations in which the decision maker is not sure about his risk
attitudes within states.
7 Proofs
7.1 Proof of theorem 1
(i) ⇒ (ii). If  is empty then, by deﬁnition, p < q and q < p, for all p,q ∈ C.
Let U be the set of all constant real-valued functions on C.
Henceforth, assume that  is not empty.
Claim 1. < satisﬁes independence (that is, for all p,q,r ∈ C and α ∈
(0,1], p < q implies αp + (1 − α)r < αq + (1 − α)r).
Proof of claim 1: Suppose that p < q. Let s  αp + (1 − α)r, we need
to show that s  αq + (1 − α)r. Fix t  p such that s  αt + (1 − α)r. To
establish that such t exists, let B (p) = {` ∈ C | `  p}, for all p ∈ C, and
deﬁne
T (αp + (1 − α)r) = {α` + (1 − α)r ∈ C | ` ∈ B (p)}.
Then B (αp + (1 − α)r) ⊃ T (αp + (1 − α)r).
Let C0 denote the algebraic interior of C. Consider ﬁrst the case in which
p ∈ C0. Given s ∈ B (αp + (1 − α)r), let `(γ) = γs+(1 − γ)(αp + (1 − α)r).
Apply (A.3) twice to obtain s  `(γ)  αp + (1 − α)r for all γ ∈ (0,1).
Let ε ∈ (0,1) and deﬁne Nε (αp + (1 − α)r) = {`(γ) ∈ C | γ ∈ (0,ε)}
then, for suﬃciently small ε, Nε (αp + (1 − α)r) ⊂ T (αp + (1 − α)r). Thus
`(γ) ∈ B (p). Let t = `(γ0) for some γ0 ∈ (0,ε).
30See discussion in Seidenfeldt et. al. (1995) and Karni (2009).
23Suppose next that p ∈ C − C0. Let p0 ∈ C0 such that p0 D p and s 
αp0+(1 − α)r. (To show that such p0 exists, note that, by (A.3) and deﬁnition
1, αp00 +(1 − α)r D αp+(1 − α)r for all p00 satisfying p00 D p. In particular,
αp00 +(1 − α)p D p. If s  αp00 +(1 − α)r let p0 = p00. If αp00 +(1 − α)r  s
 αp + (1 − α)r then, by (A.2), there exist β ∈ (0,1) such that
s  α(βp
00 + (1 − β)p) + (1 − α)r.
Let p0 = βp00+(1 − β)p. Then p0 satisﬁes the requirements mentioned above.)
Repeat the above argument replacing p with p0. Then t  p0 . If p0 D p then,
in particular, p0 < p. Hence, by deﬁnition 1, t  p.
By (A.3) αt+(1 − α)r  αp+(1 − α)r. But s  αt+(1 − α)r, hence, ap-
ply (A.3) twice to obtain, s  β (αt + (1 − α)r) + (1 − β)(αp + (1 − α)r).
Thus s  α(βt + (1 − β)p) + (1 − α)r. By (A.3), βt + (1 − β)p  p im-
plying that βt + (1 − β)p  q. Thus s  α(βt + (1 − β)p) + (1 − α)r 
αq + (1 − α)r, where the last preference follows from (A.3). Hence, αp +
(1 − α)r < αq + (1 − α)r. ♣
A preference relation < is said to satisfy mixture monotonicity if p  q
and 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1 imply that βp + (1 − β)q  αp + (1 − α)q.
Claim 2: < satisﬁes mixture monotonicity.
The proof, by standard argument, is an implication of (A.3).31
Claim 3. Let pM and pm be the greatest and smallest elements of C,
respectively. Then, for each q ∈ C, there exist α(q),α(q) ∈ (0,1) such that
αpM + (1 − α)pm  q for all α > α(q) and q  αpM + (1 − α)pm for all
α < α(q).
Proof of claim 3: Let S+
q = {α ∈ [0,1] | αpM + (1 − α)pm  q}. Since
S+
q is not empty (e.g., 1 ∈ S+
q ) and bounded, the inﬁmum of S+
q exists. Let
α(q) = inf S+
q . By mixture monotonicity, α > α(q) implies α ∈ S+
q .
Next we show that α(q) / ∈ S+
q . Suppose, by way of negation, that α(q) ∈
S+
q then, by (A.2), there is β ∈ (0,1) such that β
 
α(q)pM + (1 − α(q))pm
+
(1 − β)pm  q. Hence βα(q)pM + (1 − βα(q))pm  q. By mixture mono-
tonicity, αpM + (1 − α)pm  q for all α > β¯ α(q). But ¯ α(q) > β¯ α(q), thus
¯ α(q) is not a lower bound of S+
p . A contradiction.
Let α(q) be the supremum of S−
q := {α ∈ [0,1] | q  αpM + (1 − α)pm}.
By similar argument, α ∈ Sq for all α(q) > α, and α(q) / ∈ S−
q . ♣
31See Kreps (1988).
24Claim 4. For all q ∈ C, α(q)pM + (1 − ¯ α(q))pm D q and q D α(q)pM +
(1 − α(q))pm.
Proof of claim 4: Let r  α(q)pM+(1 − ¯ α(q))pm then, by (A.2), there is
β ∈ (0,1) such that r  [β (1 − α(q)) + α(q)]pM+(1 − β (1 − ¯ α(q)) + ¯ α(q))pm.
But α(q) < α(q) + β (1 − α(q)), hence
[β (1 − α(q)) + α(q)]p




Thus, by transitivity, r  q. Hence, by Deﬁnition 1, α(q)pM+(1 − α(q))pm <
q.
Moreover, α(q) / ∈ S+
q implies that ¬(q  α(q)s + (1 − α(q))pm. Hence,
by Deﬁnition 1, α(q)pM + (1 − α(q))pm D q.
The proof that q D α(q)pM +(1 − α(q))pm is by the same argument. ♣
For every p ∈ C, let L(p) be the linear subspace spanned by the vectors




Claim 5. The functions α(·) and α(·) are aﬃne on L(p) ∩ C.
Proof of claim 5: Let p,q ∈ L(p) and suppose that p < q. Deﬁne
ϕ(p) = α(p)pM +(1 − α(p))pm. Then ϕ(p)−p is parallel to ϕ(q)−q. To see
this, suppose, by way of negation that ϕ(p) − p is not parallel to ϕ(q) − q,
then
{q + λ(ϕ(p) − p) | λ ≥ 0}∩ < p
m,p
M >= ϕ(q) + µ(p
M − p
m), (16)
where < pm,pM >:= {λpM+(1 − λ)pm | λ ∈ R} is the line that goes through
pM and pm.
Two vectors being nonparallel implies that µ 6= 0. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that µ > 0. By claim 1 and (A.3), βp + (1 − β)q < q. For
suﬃciently small β, ϕ(q) + µ(pM − pm)  ϕ(βp + (1 − β)q) < ϕ(q). Then
there exists r ∈ (ϕ(βp + (1 − β)q),ϕ(q)). This means r  βp + (1 − β)q
and ¬(r  q). This contradicts βp + (1 − β)q < q.
The aﬃnity of α(·) is proved similarly. ♣
Claim 6. The function α(·) is convex on C.
Proof of claim 6: Let p and q be such that L(p) 6= L(q) and α(p) =
α(q) = ˆ α. Thus, ˆ αpM+(1 − ˆ α)pm < p,q. By Claim 1, βp+(1 − β)
 
ˆ αpM + (1 − ˆ α)pm
<








βp + (1 − β)
 
ˆ αp
M + (1 − ˆ α)p
m
= βα(p)+(1 − β)α
 
ˆ αp
M + (1 − ˆ α)p
m
= ˆ α.
Hence, by Deﬁnition 1, ˆ α ≥ α(βp + (1 − β)q). Thus, α(βp + (1 − β)q) ≤
ˆ α = βα(p) + (1 − β)α(q). ♣
Let {ei ∈ L | i = 1,...,n} be the canonical basis of L. By mixture
monotonicity, pM = ei and pm = ej, for some i,j. Without loss of generality,
let pM = en and pm = e1. For every i ∈ {1,...,n − 2} and λ ∈ [0,1], deﬁne
q (i,λ) = λei + (1 − λ)ei+1, and q (n − 1,λ) = λen−1 + (1 − λ)e1. For every
p ∈ C, let L(p,q (i,λ)) be the linear subspace spanned by pM, p and q (i,λ).
Let J = {p ∈ C | eM  p  ei, i = 1,...,n − 1}. For every λ ∈ [0,1],
deﬁne
α
iλ (p) = inf{α ∈ [0,1] | αe
M + (1 − α)q (i,λ)  p}.
By the same argument as above, αiλ (·) is a convex function on J whose
restriction to L(p,q (i,λ)) is aﬃne.
Fix p ∈ J and let Q = {q ∈ J | αiλ (q) = αiλ (p)}. The every p ∈ C may
be expressed as p = ςpM +(1 − ς)q for some q ∈ Q and 1 ≥ ς. Extend αiλ (·)
to C by deﬁning αiλ (p) = 1 − (1 − ς)αiλ (p).
By convexity, αiλ (·) is diﬀerentiable everywhere, except possibly at a
countable number of points. For every p ∈ C at which αiλ (·) is diﬀerentiable,
denote by ∇αiλ (p) the gradient vector of αiλ (·) at p.33 The aﬃnity of αiλ (·)
on L(p,q (i,λ)) implies that ∇αiλ (p) = ∇αiλ (r) for all r ∈ L(p,q (i,λ)).
Deﬁne G = {∇αiλ
p ∈ Rn | i = 1,...,n − 1, λ ∈ [0,1],p ∈ Q}. For each
u ∈ Rn deﬁne a function U : C → R by U (q) = u · q. Let U := {U | u ∈ G},
then, by deﬁnition, U ∈ U implies that U is aﬃne.
By deﬁnition of αiλ (·), q  p implies αiλ (q) > αiλ (p), for all αiλ (·), and
q < p implies αiλ (q) ≥ αiλ (p), for all αiλ (·). But αiλ (q) > αiλ (p) if and
only if αiλ
r (q) > αiλ
r (p) for all i = 1,...,n − 1, λ ∈ [0,1] and r ∈ Q. Thus,
by deﬁnition q  p implies U (p) > U (q) for all U ∈ U and q < p implies
U (p) ≥ U (q).
33Denote by Gαiλ the epigraph of αiλ (·), then Gαiλ and C are convex sets, hence,





be a supporting hyperplane of Gαiλ at p.That such a hyperplane
exists follows from the fact that the algebraic interior, Go





26To show the converse, let U (q) ≥ U (p) for all U ∈ U, and suppose, by
way of negation, that not q < p. If p  q then, by necessity, U (p) > U (q),
for all U ∈ U, which is a contradiction. Suppose that q ./ p and let ∂B (r)
denote the boundary of the upper contour set, B (r), of r.
Claim 7: For all q,p ∈ C, q ./ p implies that ∂B (q) ∩ ∂B (p) 6= ∅.
Proof of claim 7: Since B (p) and B(q) are full dimensional cones, q ./ p
implies that there exist d ∈ ∂B (q) such that the ray hd,qi := {ξ (d − q) |
ξ > 0}, intersects B (p). Let r = hd,qi∩B (p). Thus, r ∈ ∂B (q)∩∂B (p).♣
Choose r ∈ ∂B (q)∩∂B (p), then r < p and r < q. Let t = hp,ri∩∂C then,
by deﬁnition, U (t) = U (p) = U (r) for some U ∈ U. Moreover, U (t) > U (q)
implying that U (r) > U (q). Hence, U (p) > U (q). A contradiction.
Hence, q < p if and only if U (q) ≥ U (p), for all U ∈ U. By the same
argument, q  p if and only if U (q) > U (p) for all U ∈ U. This complete
the proof that (i) implies (ii).
The proof the (ii) implies (i) is straightforward.
To prove the uniqueness, let V = {
r X
j=1
λjUj+d | λj > 0,
r X
j=1
λj = 1,d ∈ R,
Uj ∈ U and r ∈ N}, then, obviously, V (p) > V (q) for all V ∈ V if and only
if U (p) > U (q) for all U ∈ U. The aﬃnity of U ∈ U implies the aﬃnity of
V.
Let V be a set of real-valued, aﬃne, functions on C and suppose that
V represents < in the sense of (2). Suppose that there is v0 ∈ V and v0
is not in the cone spanned by U. Because the cone spanned by U is closed
and has a non-empty interior, by the separating hyperplane theorem, there
is t ∈ Rn such that u· t
ktk < 0 < v0· t
ktk for all u ∈ U. Take p,q ∈ C such that
t
ktk = p − q. Then u · q > u · p and v0 · p > v0 · q. A contradiction. 
7.2 Proof of theorem 2
(i) ⇒ (ii). Axioms (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and Corollary 2 imply that every
w ∈ W may be expressed as | S |-tuple (w(·,1),...,w(·,| S |)) ∈ W1 ×
... × W|S| and, for all h,f ∈ H, h < f if and only if
P
s∈S w(h(s),s) ≥ P
s∈S w(f (s),s) for all w ∈ W.
Let B := {λ(h0 − h) | h0 < h,h0,h ∈ H,λ ≥ 0}. Then B is a closed
convex cone with non-empty interior in ﬁnite dimensional linear space. By
theorem V.9.8 in Dunford and Schwartz (1957), there is a dense set, D, in
27its boundary such that each point of D has a unique tangent. Let Wo be
the collection of all the supporting hyperplanes corresponding to this dense
set. Without loss of generality we assume that each function in Wo has unit
normal vector. It is easy to see that Wo represents < .
For every f ∈ H let Hc (f) be the convex-hull of {fs | s ∈ S}. Then,
fα ∈ Hc (f) is the constant act deﬁned by fα = Σs∈Sαsfs for all α ∈ ∆(S).
Now, (A.3) implies that g  fs for every s ∈ S if and only if g  fα for every
α ∈ ∆(S). Suﬃciency if immediate since, for all s ∈ S, δs ∈ ∆(S). To prove
necessity, suppose that g  fs for all s ∈ S. Apply (A.3) twice to obtain
g = αg + (1 − α)g  αg + (1 − α)f
s  αf
s0
+ (1 − α)f
s,
for all α ∈ [0,1] and s,s0 ∈ S. Let fs0αfs := αfs0 + (1 − α)fs, then, by
repeated application of (A.3), we have g  α0  
fs0αfs
+ (1 − α0)fs00,for all
α ∈ [0,1] and s,s0,s00 ∈ S. By the same argument, g  fα for all fa ∈ Hc (f).
Hence, an equivalent statement of (A.4) is,
(A.40) For all f,g ∈ H, g  fα for every α ∈ ∆(S) implies g  f.
Before presenting the main argument of the proof we provide some useful
facts.
Claim 1: For all f,g ∈ H, if g < fα for all α ∈ ∆(S)then g < f.
The proof is immediate application of (A.4), the preceding argument,
and Deﬁnitions 1. Henceforth, when we invoke axiom (A.4) we will use it in
either the, equivalent, strict preference form (A.4’) or the weak preference
form given in Claim 1, as the need may be.
To state the next result we invoke the following notations. For each h ∈ H
and s ∈ S, let h−sp the act that is obtained by replacing the s−th coordinate
of h, h(s), with p. Let hp denote the constant act whose payoﬀ is hp (s) = p,
for every s ∈ S
Claim 2: If hp < hq then hp < h
p
−sq, for all s ∈ S.
Proof of claim 2: For any α ∈ ∆(S), (h
p
−sq)
α is a convex combination
of hp and hq. To be exact, (h
p
−sq)
α = (1 − αs)hp + αshq). By (A.3), applied




α ∈ ∆(S)). Hence, by (A.4) and Claim 1, hp < h
p
−sq. ♣
We now turn to the main argument. In particular, we show that the com-
ponent functions, {ws}s∈S, of each essential function, w ∈ Wo, that ﬁgures
in the representation are positive linear transformations of one another.
Lemma: If ˆ w ∈ Wo then, for all non-null s,t ∈ S, ˆ w(·,s) and ˆ w(·,t) are
positive linear transformations of one another.
28Proof of Lemma: By way of negation, suppose that there exist s,t such
that ˆ w(·,s) and ˆ w(·,t) are not positive linear transformations of one another.
Then there are p,q ∈ ∆(X) such that ˆ w(p,s) > ˆ w(q,s) and ˆ w(q,t) > ˆ w(p,t).
Without loss of generality, let p in the interior of ∆(X) be such that ˆ w(hp) >
ˆ w(hq). Deﬁne q(λ) = λp + (1 − λ)q for λ ∈ (0,1), then ˆ w(p,s) > ˆ w(q(λ),s)
and ˆ w(q(λ),t) > ˆ w(p,t). Following Ok et. al. (2008), we use the following
construction. Let fλ ∈ H be deﬁned as follows: fλ(s0)= p if s0 = s, fλ(s0)=
q (λ) if s0 = t, and, for s0 6= s,t, fλ(s0) = p if w(p,s0) ≥ w(q (λ),s0), and
fλ(s0) = q (λ) otherwise.
Clearly, Σs∈S ˆ w(fλ (s),s) > Σs∈S ˆ w(fλ
α (s),s), for all α ∈ ∆(S). Since fλ
involves only p and q (λ), {fλ
α | α ∈ ∆(S)} = {αhp + (1 − α)hq(λ) | α ∈
[0,1]}.
Since ˆ w ∈ Wo, there exists g ∈ H such that g < hp, ˆ w(g) = ˆ w(hp) and
ˆ w is the unique supporting hyperplane at g.
Claim 3: There exist β
∗ > 0 such that hp + β
∗ (g − hp) < hq(λ)
Proof of claim 3: Suppose not. Then, for any n ∈ {1,2,...}, there exists
wn ∈ Wo such that wn (hp + n(g − hp)) < wn
 
hq(λ)
. Since wn is linear, we
can regard wn as a vector and wn (f) as the inner product wn · f. Hence, we
have
nwn · (g − h





, for all n. (17)
Since kwnk = 1, we can ﬁnd convergent subsequence {wnk}. Without
loss of generality we assume that {wn} itself is convergent and wn → w∗ ∈




If w∗ · (g − hp) > 0 then the left-hand side of inequality (17) will exlode
to +∞ as n → ∞. A contradiction. Hence, w∗ (g) = w∗ (hp). Also,
wn (hp) ≤ wn (hp + n(g − hp)) < wn
 
hq(λ)
implies w∗ (hp) ≤ w∗  
hq(λ)
.
Since ˆ w(hp) > ˆ w
 
hq(λ)
, ˆ w 6= w∗. This contradicts the uniqueness of the
supporting hyperplane at g ∈ H. This completes the proof of claim 3.
29fl
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Let gλ = hp + β (g − hp). Then gλ < hp and gλ < hq(λ). By choosing λ
close to 1, we can ﬁnd gλ that is feasible (i.e., gλ(s) ∈ ∆(X) for all s ∈ S).
By virtue of being on the hyperplane deﬁned by w, Σs∈Sw(gλ (s),s) = w(hp).
Since gλ < hp,hq(λ), we have gλ < (fλ)α, for all α ∈ ∆(S). Hence, by (A.4)
and Claim 1, gλ < fλ. But Σs∈S ˆ w(fλ (s),s) > ˆ w(hp) = Σs∈S ˆ w(gλ (s),s),
which is a contradiction. (See Figure 3). Hence, if ˆ w(·,s) and ˆ w(·,t) are not
positive linear transformation of one another then ˆ w / ∈ Wo. This completes
the proof of the Lemma. ♣
The representation follows by standard argument. For each w ∈ Wo,




Deﬁne πw (s) = bw
s /Σs0∈Sbw
s0, for all s ∈ S. Let U be the collection of distinct
Uw and for each U ∈ U, let ΠU = {πw | ∀w such that Uw = U}.
To see we can also represent strict relation , we need to consider the
following. Any supporting hyperplane w of B can be expressed as a limit
point of sequence {wn} from Wo. Since any wn has the property that each of
its component is a positive linear transformation of one another, w has the
same property. If we add all those w’s into Wo, then the new set of functions
will represent both < and  .
(ii) ⇒ (i). Axioms (A.1) - (A.3) are implied by Corollary 2. Axioms
(A.4) is an immediate implication of the representation. 
7.3 Proof of theorem 3
(i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose that  on H satisﬁes (A.1) - (A.5). We show ﬁrst that
M is a convex set. Let ξT and ξT0 be the normals corresponding to T,T 0 ∈ T .
30Let
ˆ T := {z ∈ R
|S|×|X| | (λξT + (1 − λ)ξT0) · (z − h
x) = 0}. (18)
Than ˆ T is an hyperplane in R|S|×|X| that passes through hx. We need to
show that B (hx) ⊂ ˆ T +. Take any f ∈ B (hx), since B (hx) ⊂ T + ∩ T 0+,
ξT ·(f − hx) ≥ 0 and ξT0·(f − hx) ≥ 0. Thus, (λξT + (1 − λ)ξT0)·(f − hx) ≥
0. Hence, ˆ T is a supporting hyperplane of B (hx) at hx.
By deﬁnition, β ˆ T (s) = Σx∈X (λξT + (1 − λ)ξT0)(x,s) = λβT (s)+(1 − λ)βT0 (s),
for all s ∈ S. Deﬁne α ˆ T ∈ ∆(S) by α ˆ T (s) = β ˆ T (s)/Σs0∈Sβ ˆ T (s0), for all
s ∈ S. Then, α ˆ T = λαT +(1 − λ)αT0, λ ∈ (0,1) and, by deﬁnition, α ˆ T ∈ M.
Hence M is convex.
By (A.5), g  f implies that gα  fα, for all α ∈ M. By Theorem 2,
gα  fα for all α ∈ M if and only if U (gα) > U (fα) for all U ∈ U and
α ∈ M. By the aﬃnity of U ∈ U, U (gα) > U (fα) for all U ∈ U and α ∈ M
if and only if
P
s∈S U (g (s))α(s) >
P
s∈S U (f (s))α(s), for all (α,U) ∈
M×U. Hence, g  f implies
P
s∈S U (g (s))α(s) >
P
s∈S U (f (s))α(s), for
all (α,U) ∈ M × U.
To prove the inverse implication, note that, by Theorem 2, gα  fα if and
only if U (gα) > U (fα) for all U ∈ U. Thus, by the aﬃnity of U ∈ U, gα  fα
for all α ∈ M if and only if
P
s∈S U (g (s))α(s) >
P
s∈S U (f (s))α(s), for all
(α,U) ∈ M×U. But, by Theorem 2,
P
s∈S U (g (s))α(s) >
P
s∈S U (f (s))α(s),
for all (α,U) ∈ {(α,U) | U ∈ U,α ∈ ΠU} if and only if g  f. Since
M ⊇ ∪U∈UΠU, this implies the representation (9) in Theorem 3. The repre-
sentation (8) follows by similar argument.
(ii) ⇒ (i). The necessity of the  −boundedness of H and (A.1)-(A.4)
follows from Theorem 2. To prove the necessity of (A.5), we need to show
that M = M0, where M0 is deﬁned as in (A.5). M ⊆ M0 is easy to
show. To show that M0 ⊆ M, suppose there exist π ∈ M0 − M. For
any U ∈ U, the hyperplane corresponding (π,U) is a supporting hyperplane
of “better than” sets in H. This hyperplane can be expressed as a convex
combination of essential hyperplanes supporting the “better than” sets. By
Theorem 2, those essential hyperplanes correspond to probability-utility pairs
(πλ,Uλ)λ∈Λ ⊂ M×U, where Λ is the index set of the essential functions that
ﬁgure in Theorem 2. Thus, π is a convex combination of (πλ)λ∈Λ. Since M
is convex, we have π ∈ M which is a contradiction.
The uniqueness is implied by the uniqueness of the representations in
Theorem 2. 
317.4 Proof of theorem 4
(i) ⇒ (ii). By Corollary 2, p <s q if and only if
P
x∈X w(x,s)p(x) ≥ P
x∈X w(x,s)q (x), for all w ∈ W. But the preference relation <s on
∆(X) is a complete, (A.6), weak order satisfying the Archimedean, (A.2),
and independence axioms (A.3). Thus, by the von Neumann Morgenstern
expected utility theorem it has an expected utility representation, p 7→ P
x∈X us (x)p(x), where us (·) is unique up to positive linear transforma-
tion.
Let t ∈ S be nonnull (that such a state exists is implied by the non-
emptiness of ) and deﬁne u(·) = ut (·). By Lemma 2, the functions {us (·)}s∈S
are positive linear transformations of one another. Moreover, by the unique-
ness of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem, for each
w ∈ W, w(·,s) = bwsu(·) + aws, where bws > 0 if s is nonnull and bws = 0




follows from the representation (6), where Π = {πw (s) | w ∈ W}.
The proof that (ii) ⇒ (i) is straightforward.
The uniqueness follows from the uniqueness in Theorem 1. 
7.5 Proof of theorem 5
First we show that (A.7) assures a unique probability over S.
Claim 1: Under (A.7), πu(E) = πl(E).
Proof of claim 1: Mixture monotonicity implies that πu(E) > πl(E).
Suppose πu(E) > πl(E). Then there exists α1,α2 such that πu(E) > α1 >
α2 > πl(E). Since πu(E) > α1 implies pMα1pm  pMEpm does not hold,
(A.7) implies pMEpm  pMα2pm which is a contradiction to α2 > πl(E).
Therefore, πu(E) = πl(E). ♣
Deﬁne π(E) := πu(E) = πl(E). Next, we show that π is a probability
measure.
Claim 2: Under (A.7), π : 2S → [0,1] is a probability measure.
Proof of claim 2: By deﬁnition π(S) = 1. Since S is a ﬁnite set, it is
enough to show that π(E ∪ {s}) = π(E) + π(s) for all E ⊆ S and for all
s / ∈ E.
First, we show π(E ∪ {s}) ≤ π(E) + π(s). Without loss of generality,
assume that π(E)+π(s) < 1. Pick any ε > 0 such that π(E)+π(s)+2ε < 1.
32Then there exist α1,α2,β1,β2 ∈ [0,1] such that π(E) < β1 < α1 < π(E) + ε
and π(s) < β2 < α2 < π(s) + ε.
If we can show that pM(α1 + α2)pm  pM(E ∪ {s})pm, 34then we have
π(E ∪ {s}) < α1 + α2 < π(E) + π(s) + 2ε which implies π(E ∪ {s}) ≤
π(E) + π(s). Suppose that pM(α1 + α2)pm  pM(E ∪ {s})pm does not hold.
Then, by (A.7), pM(β1 + β2)pm ≺ pM(E ∪ {s})pm.
We know that pMβ1pm  pMEpm and pMβ2pm  pM{s}pm imply that,




























But this is obviously a contradiction to pM(β1 + β2)pm ≺ pM(E ∪ {s})pm.
Thus, π(E ∪ {s}) ≤ π(E) + π(s).
Suppose π(E ∪ {s}) < π(E) + π(s). Then there exist α such that π(E ∪
{s}) < α < π(E) + π(s). Since 0 ≤ α − π(E) < π(s), we can ﬁnd α1 < α
such that α − π(E) < α1 < π(s). Thus, we have α − α1 ∈ (0,π(E)) and















This is a contradiction to π(E ∪ {s}) < α. ♣
Now we enter the proof of Theorem 5. Suppose α > π(E). Then, by
Corollary 2,









m,s), ∀w ∈ W.
(24)














































s/ ∈E w(pM,s) −
P
s/ ∈E w(pm,s)










s/ ∈E w(pM,s) −
P
s/ ∈E w(pm,s)
, ∀w ∈ W. (28)
For all α < π(E), we can repeat the same argument. Therefore, we get, for
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s/ ∈E w(pM,s) −
P
s/ ∈E w(pm,s)
, ∀w ∈ W. (30)









s/ ∈E w(pM,s) −
P
s/ ∈E w(pm,s)
, ∀w ∈ W. (31)
But Lemma 3 implies that whenever hx  hm, pMαpm  pMEpm if and only
































































Suppose h,g ∈ ∆(X)S. Then, for all w ∈ W,



















π(si)w(g(si),s1), ∀w ∈ W.
(35)
Deﬁne U = {w(·,s1)|w ∈ W}. Then, (34) and (35) implies






π(s)U(g(s)), ∀U ∈ U. (36)
By repeating exactly the same argument, we can show






π(s)U(g(s)), ∀U ∈ U. (37)

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